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2021 CANADA-U.S. LAW INSTITUTE
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE –
WORKING WITH THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION:
WHAT WE NEED TO DO
MARCH 10, 2021

Colin Robertson
Moderator: Chios Carmody
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR CHIOS CARMODY: Alright, well we might as
well get underway. Good afternoon. For those of you I haven’t met, my name is
Chi Carmody, and I’m an associate professor here at Western’s Faculty of Law.
And since 2002, I’ve been the Canadian national director of the Canada-U.S. Law
Institute.
The institute was founded in 1976 as a joint creation of Western Law and the
Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio, to examine
issues of relevance to the Canada-U.S. bilateral context. To that end, the institute
sponsors a number of activities each year, including the Canada-U.S. Law Institute
Annual Conference—the 45th edition of which is taking place online April 23, on
the theme of “Climate Change and the Arctic: Profound Disruption, Uncertain
Impact.” And that will have free admission for students, so please stay tuned for
that.
There is also publication of the Canada-U.S. Law Journal—which takes place
once annually, and is put together by a binational panel of students on both sides
of the border—and periodic Experts’ Meetings, and Distinguished Lectures such
as this, as well as our ever-popular Student Fora—the next two of which are going
to be, first of all, on Tuesday, March 23 at 6:00 p.m. focusing on negligence in law
enforcement and the differences between Canadian and U.S. law regarding the
duty of care in law enforcement and, secondly, on Wednesday, March 24 at 5:00
p.m. discussing the treatment of cases challenging lockdown orders in Canada and
the U.S. So, please join us for one or both of those. Details will be available shortly
through the SLS Daily bulletin.
This, however, is the 14th Annual Canada-U.S. Law Institute Distinguished
Lecture. And this year, our distinguished lecturer is Colin Robertson, who is vice
president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and host of its regular The
Global Exchange podcast.
Before assuming these positions, Colin worked as a diplomatic services
officer with Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs—now Global Affairs
Canada. And during his very varied foreign service career, he served as first head
of the Advocacy Secretariat and minister at the Canadian Embassy in Washington,
as consul general of Canada in Los Angeles, and consul of Canada in Hong Kong,
and in New York at our Mission to the United Nations, and the Consulate General
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there. Colin was also a member of the teams that negotiated the 1988 Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, and the 1994 NAFTA [North American Free Trade
Agreement].
Colin now writes on foreign affairs for the Globe and Mail, and is a frequent
contributor to other media. And he’ll be speaking today to us on the subject of,
“Working with the Biden Administration: What We Need to Do.”
Now, before he does that, I would like to convey a few thank yous. So, I’d
like to, first of all, thank the Faculty of Law—particularly our dean, Erika
Chamberlain, for her continuing support of this lecture. I’d like to also thank
Susanna Eayrs, the faculty’s communications officer, for liaising with Colin and
helping to promote and publicize this event. And to Corey Meingarten, the
faculty’s systems administrator, who’s ensuring a smooth broadcast and recording
of the Distinguished Lecture today.
I’d also like to thank students of this year’s Canada-U.S. Law Institute Student
Committee—particularly Victoria Ostrovsky, David Yun, and Cole Halbert, who
have helped to coordinate and assist with this Distinguished Lecture.
After Colin’s Distinguished Lecture, there’s going to be an opportunity for
questions from the audience through Zoom. So, if anyone would like to send along
questions during the lecture or thereafter, this would be appreciated. So, over to
you, Colin.
MR. COLIN ROBERTSON: Well, thank you very much, Chi. And my thanks
to you, and to Corey and Victoria, for making this going—especially Corey, who
I know is going to make sure the slides and everything come through.
Over the years, I’ve learned a lot from the work of your binational law
institute, especially when I’ve attended the sessions in Cleveland. I remember
talking with the inimitable Henry King about the Nuremberg Trials, and [Sidney]
Sid Picker about transborder environmental issues. As I say, it’s an honor to speak
at a forum that has also welcomed my friends Larry Herman, Chris Sands, Janice
Stein, Bruce Heyman, and the man from whom I probably learned the most about
dealing with the United States, the late Allan Gotlieb.
My remarks are going to come in three parts. First, the situational awareness
of the Biden challenges. Then, mindful of the new Roadmap for Canada-U.S.
relations, some rules of the road on getting it done. And I’ll conclude on a
cautionary note because, while diplomacy is inspired by idealism, it advances
through pragmatism, rooted in realism.
I became familiar with the term “situational awareness” when I visited Pacific
Command at Pearl Harbor when I was consul general in Los Angeles. Hawaii was
part of my parish. Situational awareness means being aware of one’s surroundings
and identifying potential threats in dangerous situations. It is more of a mindset
than a hard skill, but it’s as vital for diplomats as it is for the military. To
understand how we can advance Canadian interests, we first need situational
awareness of Mr. Biden’s America.
Say a prayer for Mr. Biden—he faces the most formidable set of challenges
for any president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt took power in 1932, when
America was reeling under the Great Depression. In his inaugural address, Mr.
Biden outlined the crisis facing America. First one, of course, is health. The
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pandemic death toll is awful, with over half a million dead. More Americans have
died from COVID than died during America’s twentieth century wars. Biden is on
track with his pledge of one hundred million vaccinations in one hundred days. In
fact, there are, in some cases, three million vaccinations a day. He promises
enough vaccines for everyone by the end of July.
Then there’s the economic malaise caused by the pandemic, but also
technological change and globalization. Jobless claims remain well above the
worst levels of the Great Recession. At 100 percent debt-to-GDP, U.S. debt is
higher than at any time in U. S. history, outside of World War II. By comparison,
Canadian GDP debt is now about 50 percent. And in Ontario, it’s about the same.
Americans, perhaps more than any other nation, believed they were an
exceptional people, living in what Ronald Reagan once called “the city on [a]
hill”—a new world where, if you work hard, you can succeed. But new polls tell
us most Americans think their children will be worse off than themselves, for some
reasons. The top 10 percent of Americans now own over 70 percent of the
country’s wealth. The top 1 percent controls more national income than the bottom
50 percent. Average income growth of the top 1 percent grows by 226 percent
from 1979 to 2016, while working and middle-class income distribution was
comparatively flat.
The economic turmoil continues to a larger social crisis complicated by race,
gender, class, and culture. Racial injustice, the George Floyd trial is in today’s
news. But to give Black Lives Matter some wider context, if you’re Black, you’re
twice as likely to die of COVID, and three times more likely to be hospitalized.
Black unemployment rates are double those of Whites. Net worth for median
Black households in the United States stands at $20,000, compared to $180,000
for Whites.
Then, of course, there’s migration. The pressure on the southern border from
those fleeing crime, corruption, and bad government—a movement that helped
propel Trump to the White House on the promise of a wall to keep them out.
Then, of course, there’s climate, including biodiversity and pollution, rising
temperatures and freak weather, wildfires, hurricanes, tornadoes, freezes, and
floods of biblical proportions. According to NASA, 2012 was the hottest year on
record, followed by 2019 and then 2020.
Biden must manage all these crises against a profound political divide that,
like the social crisis, is compounded by race, religion, geography, and increasingly,
class. The political divide is visceral, as we witnessed in both the election, which
saw a 67 percent turnout—the most since 1900—and in the impeachments. Despite
the attack on the Capitol, and Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell
declaring that Trump was morally responsible, only seven Republican senators,
not including McConnell, backed impeachment.
The Republican Party is still the Trump party, with half of Republicans
believing that the election was, as Trump says, “stolen.” A switch of 50,000 votes
in three states and I’d be talking today about a second Trump administration.
Republican and Democratic voters not only disagree over plans and policies,
but they also disagree on basic facts. The political challenge for Biden is not only
interparty, but also intraparty, pitting the progressive wing—AOC [Alexandria
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Ocasio-Cortez], who you see right behind Joe Manchin, and the AOC faction
includes Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren—against the moderates—of course
Biden, Kamala Harris, Nancy Pelosi, and [Charles] Chuck Schumer. As Will
Rogers once remarked, “I am not a member of any organized [political] party. I
am a Democrat.”
Biden has set himself three overriding priorities: to revive and sustain the
middle class, to fix the environment, and to restore American leadership of the free
world. He and his team believe the well-being—economic, environment, health,
social—is the best antidote to populism, and the way to defend democracy. But it
starts at home. As Biden put it, “We have to put ourselves in a position of strength
to be able to deal with the challenges we face around the world,” from the great
power competition with China to nuclear proliferation with Iran and North Korea.
[Quoted text should be attributed to National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan.—
Ed.]
As to restoring America to global leadership, Biden recently told the Munich
Security Conference, you see here Angela Merkel watching this, “We’re at an
inflection point between those who argue [that], given all the challenges we face—
from the fourth industrial revolution to a global pandemic—that autocracy is the
best way forward, [they argue,] and those who understand that democracy is
essential—essential to meeting those challenges.”
As for China, Biden says, “We cannot and must not return to the reflexive
opposition and rigid blocs of the Cold War. Competition must not lock out
cooperation on issues that affect us all. For example, we must cooperate if we’re
going to defeat COVID-19 everywhere.”
By the midterms, which are just two years away, Biden needs the pandemic
contained, and the economy growing again—especially union jobs—and a visible
reshoring of manufacturing to create jobs, as well as resiliency.
Biden’s focus must be domestic, fixing things at home by using executive
orders, legislation—as we’re seeing right now with the major relief bill, to “Build
Back Better”—and voting reform, immigration reform, and then regulation,
especially on the environment and social justice. Internationally, he needs the
allies to believe that America is back.
So, what does this all mean for Canada, and how do we get what we want
done? We get it done through focus, continuous engagement, and whenever
possible, rules-based institutions.
Our relationship will always be asymmetrical—that polysyllabic word that
actually means an awful lot. The U.S. matters more to us than we matter to them.
We level the playing field through a network of rules and agreements—at last
count, well over 20,000 in institutions. Institutions, preferably binational, like
NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], like the IJC
[International Joint Commission], and like, of course, your own law institute.
Most of our diplomacy is bilateral or multilateral, where we sit on opposite
sides of the table. But binational means, at least in theory, that our representatives
operate side by side looking for the optimum results. It’s the antithesis of Mr.
Trump’s winner take all.
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We are deeply, deeply integrated economically—a process that began before
World War II and has continued, despite bumps, ever since, beginning with the
[Canada-United States] Free Trade Agreement, the NAFTA, and now the new
Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement.
Some facts: sixty cents of every dollar we generate comes from trade. The
U.S. is our main trading partner, buying 75 percent of our exports. By comparison,
the European Union takes about 8 percent, and China 4 percent. The U.S. provides
over half of our imports and almost half of our foreign investment.
The U.S. also provides our security blanket. We became allies before World
War II, negotiating defense production sharing agreements, and then a binational
alliance with NORAD in 1957 that now covers air and sea. We’re also allied
through NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization].
We share the top half of our continent. The third, often forgotten, but
increasingly important piece in our institutional architecture, is our joint
stewardship of the environment. The International Joint Commission—our oldest
binational agency—has successfully managed our waterways for over a century,
set up in 1909. These institutions represent a continuous process of continuous
engagement. That’s how we get it done.
The Roadmap [for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership] signed off last month
by Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden is but the latest iteration in
neighborly relations that is both a model and envy for others. The [six] goals
enumerated in the Roadmap spell out our current shared objectives. Top of the list,
of course, is COVID—Combatting COVID-19 at home and abroad. Building Back
Better in a sustainable fashion, that also addresses new threats, like cyber.
Accelerating Climate Ambitions, starting with a common approach between
Canada and the United States on things like carbon pricing, complementary
standards on emissions, sharing research and development, and innovation.
Advancing Diversity and Inclusion, with a focus on the disadvantaged groups—
women, visible minorities, and Indigenous peoples—in recognition that the rising
tide of globalization did not lift all boats. Bolstering Security and Defense,
including modernization of NORAD, especially its North Warning System.
Building Global Alliances to address the threat of authoritarianism, but with
burden-sharing so the U.S. doesn’t pull all the load. This also means reform of
rules-based order institutions, like the World Trade Organization and the World
Health Organization.
To achieve progress on the Roadmap, we need to stay focused and engaged,
because getting it done is always the hard part. “Getting it done” is a phrase another
of my mentors, Derek Burney—who served as Brian Mulroney’s chief of staff,
and then as our ambassador in Washington—would remind us of often, as we
strategized about high policy. Yes, situational awareness and a vision of strategy,
tactics, and objectives is vital. But then we have to, as Derek would put it, “get it
done.”
Over my now forty plus years of working on Canada-U.S. relations, I’ve
learned through trial and error some useful lessons—rules of the road for engaging
the United States. They’re complementary to, and a companion to the ten rules
enunciated by Allan Gotlieb in his ‘I’ll be with you in a minute, Mr. Ambassador’:

114

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45, 2021]

The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington. Gotlieb, of course, gave
this first lecture.
Still relevant, these three of his rules are especially current. One, “The
particular process by which a decision is reached in Washington is often so
complex and mysterious that it defies comprehension.” Two, “Since there are so
many participants in decision-making, so many special interests and pressure
groups, and so many shifting alliances, a diplomat cannot design any grand or
overarching strategy to further his nation’s interests. Every issue requires its own
micro-strategy and every micro-strategy is unique.” Three, “No permanent
solutions are within reach of the ambassador or his government, only temporary
ones. Instability is the norm, alliances and coalitions are always being forged,
forces and counterforces are always mounting.”
I kept a copy of Gotlieb’s book on my desk alongside the U.S. Constitution
during my time in Washington. That, and subsequent experiences, helped me draft
my own ten rules of the road for getting it done when dealing with Uncle Sam.
And I’ll start with them, and I’ve put them up.
Get our collective act together, because Americans will always exploit our
differences. Know what is our “ask” and what is our “give.” Know our facts, offer
solutions not whinging, and get to the point. Save the White House for what is
really important.
Second, Americans like big ideas. Be brief, be blunt, be bold. Go for gold—
ask for what we really want rather than what we think they will give us. If we don’t
take the initiative, then we take what is on offer.
Three, public diplomacy—and I would include here, of course, social media—
is as important as closed-door diplomacy. We have, when we talk to Americans,
three main messages. The first is really important: We have your back—because
national security trumps everything else when you deal with the United States.
Second, we are a trusted trading partner, “making things together” with our goods,
services, and resources fueling “Build Back Better.” And the third message, of
course, as co-tenants of the environment, we are joint stewards of our land, water,
and air.
And these were the three that, when I worked Capitol Hill and deal with
Americans, I would always come back to—especially that first one, “We have
your back.” When I first went to Washington, worked Capitol Hill, I felt like a
Fuller Brush salesman—I’d go in, make a pitch, they’d like us, and I’d go. I wasn’t
getting through. So, after about three months, I had one of the officers in the
Canadian Defense Liaison group put on his uniform, come up with me. It made all
the difference. Keep in mind, 25 percent of Americans who serve in Congress have
done uniformed service. That uniform, what that uniform represented, and what
the officer could talk about—most Canadians have served with Americans—they
could underline the point, we have your back. Again, vital.
These next two slides are banners we had made, and we used to put on the
Embassy—still do, I think—on the first week of July. That, of course, covers July
1 and July 4, underlining the point, “Friends. Neighbors. Allies.” Keeping in mind
our Embassy in Washington is on Pennsylvania Avenue and, as Kamala Harris
now goes up to Capitol Hill regularly to vote, she passes the Embassy on the way.
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And the second one, because we didn’t go into Iran—which proved to be quite
clever on Mr. [Jean] Chrétien’s part—but we were in Afghanistan. We got this
poster made, and we put it in the Metro and judiciary and everything, to underline
that we were still America’s allies.
My fourth point, make it a U.S. issue and identify U.S. allies. There are always
more Americans who think like Canadians than there are Canadians. Play by
American rules, so use lobbyists and lawyers. Again, sometimes we think, “Oh,
we shouldn’t do this.” But that’s how it works in the States.
The administration is our entry point, but the battleground is Congress, the
states, and cities. For legislators, who must fundraise daily—and they’ve got to
fundraise about $5,000 daily—all politics is local, and all trade is local, so we have
to make it local as well. And remember, in politics, if you’re not on the offense,
you’re playing defense.
Six, beware of noise. The American system is fundamentally different from
ours, with checks and balances and separation of powers. Most proposed
legislation fails. Often, I’ll see in the papers in Canada, “Ah, Congress introduces
this or that bill.” Keep in mind that only about 2 percent of what’s introduced in
the American Congress gets through, as opposed to our system, where most gets
done [that] comes through.
Next point: protectionism is as American as apple pie and as old as the
republic. Frank McKenna, who was our ambassador, once said to me, “When did
the softwood lumber dispute start?” I phoned up my friend, who was the librarian
of Congress. He came back to me and said it goes to George Washington’s second
administration, when timber merchants in Massachusetts—which included Maine
at that point—put up a tariff to keep out New Brunswick timber from being used
in building ships.
This next point is also important because I know we’re doing it today, and we
shouldn’t. Don’t ask for an exemption, ask for reciprocal treatment—that’s the art
of the deal. We’re not going to get exemptions.
Eight, Americans like us more than we like them. But business is business,
and the business of America is business, so don’t ever expect gratitude for what
we think we did for them. The latest Gallup poll, 94 percent of Americans like
Canadians, the Brits are next. And this has been remarkably consistent, for as long
as Gallup has been doing polling. So, keep that in mind when you talk to
Americans.
Ninth point: we can disagree without being disagreeable—this is something
that Brian Mulroney practiced extremely well. No surprises, especially in issues
of national security. I saw this happen a couple of times, around going into Iraq
the second time, and around ballistic missile defense, when we sent mixed signals.
The one area the Americans hate surprises on [is] national security.
My final rule of the road: It’s a permanent campaign, requiring engagement at
every level, early and often. We need a thousand points of contact—prime minister
to president, premiers and governors, cabinets, legislators, mayors, business to
business, labor to labor, and civil society. And it has to go on.
Get this right, and we can not only advance Canadian objectives, but we can
enhance our international standing. Brian Mulroney, the prime minister who best
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understands the United States, put it this way: “There is [also] a rule of global
politics—Canada’s influence in the world is measured to a significant degree by
the extent to which we are perceived as having real influence in Washington.”
A cautionary note: in his 1862 address to Congress, while waging the Civil
War, President Lincoln said, “In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom
to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly
save, or meanly lose, [the] last best hope of earth.” We want the United States to
succeed. We want Joe Biden to succeed. We want a united and democratic
America, just like we want a united, democratic Canada. We all want to see a
return to optimism and pragmatism—the can-do spirit that has been the enduring
American characteristic, and one that we all admire. We can do a great deal
together and, with the rules of the road in mind, get it done.
The U.S. political scientist, Ian Bremmer, recently observed the United States
is a country of contradictions. It set the global standard on game-changing
vaccines, while leading the world in COVID deaths and hospitalizations. Its
markets were at record highs, while the Capitol Building was stormed by violent
insurrectionists. It flawlessly landed the new Mars mission, while Texas suffered
unprecedented power outages and no clean water. For all the innovation and
growth, the politics of the United States are profoundly dysfunctional, and getting
worse.
As Attorney General [Merrick Garland] said in his confirmation hearing, his
priority is domestic terrorism. Whenever there’s a crisis—pandemic response, the
presidential election, or Texas energy debacle—the U.S. shifts into the blame
mold. That’s not the city on the hill.
Authoritarianism—whether monarchies, dictators, or oligarchies—not
freedom and democracy, has been the prevailing system of government for most
of recorded history. Once more, we have an authoritarian model—Xi Jinping’s
China, one where their economy has done better than any democracy each year for
thirty years. As democracies turn inward, authoritarianism surges, contributing to
the fifteenth consecutive year of decline in global freedom, according to Freedom
House’s just released annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties
[Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege]. Xi Jinping can claim his
model preserves order, while giving prosperity. Now, he’s exporting it abroad
through the Belt and Road Initiative, and through reinterpreting and revisiting the
rules of international organizations.
So, I conclude by saying we’ve enjoyed what historian Margaret MacMillan
describes as a “Long Peace,” and the triumph of democracy, or what scholar
[Francis] Fukuyama once called “The End of History.” But to quote that Nobel
Laureate, Bob Dylan, “the times they are a-changin’.”
Study history, and you realize that neither that Long Peace nor democracy is
guaranteed. Study history, and you know that the good guys don’t always come
first. While posted in New York City in the late seventies, I got to know the
legendary BBC journalist Alistair Cooke. For half a century, he read listeners a
weekly Letter from America. Cooke told me, “America is a country in which I see
the most persistent idealism and the blandest of cynicism, and race is on between
its vitality and its decadence.”
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So, I repeat what I said at the beginning: Say a prayer for Joe Biden. Thank
you.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Thank you very much. That was great.
I wanted to follow up with a couple of points that you made during your
remarks. You’ve mentioned that we’re entering into, or we’ve entered into, a very
turbulent time politically. This has been building now for several years, and it
seems to be a sort of confluence of a lot of different factors that are playing out in
U.S. politics and, to some extent, abroad as well. These include things like climate
change, and they include things like unfinished work of the civil rights movement,
and they include things like industrial decline, and the shift to a new economy, or
lack thereof. At this particular juncture, given what you’ve said, Colin, what
should we be thinking about as our “ask,” and what’s our “give” at the moment?
MR. ROBERTSON: What we want, and what is vital for us, is access to the
American market. And, from that, everything else sort of follows.
What the Americans want from us is a reliable ally, and I think that’s been the
traditional compromise. This goes back to, really, the beginning of modern
Canada-U.S. relations. That was set in place by Franklin Roosevelt, who I think
was the president that best understood Canada. Remember he used to summer in
Canada—Campobello, and that’s where he caught polio.
And [William Lyon] Mackenzie King, who I think realized, as World War II
was approaching, that Britain may not be as reliable a pillar as it had been from
1867 on. We had to have a relationship with the United States because, you go
back in Mackenzie King’s heritage, you know, his grandfather had been around
when the Americans, not that long after we had fought the War of 1812, 1814 with
the United States. So, for his generation, there was still this threat that the United
States had only recently become a friend. And what he set out to do, and
succeeded, was to make the United States an ally. And basically, the compromise
that he and Franklin Roosevelt reached was access for Canada to the U.S.
market—something we had tried to do since even before confederation. We had a
reciprocity trade agreement from 1854 to 1866, but it exploded with the Civil War,
when the Brits were seen to back the South rather than the North.
And then [John A.] Macdonald tried, but failed, and came up with the National
Policy. And then we made subsequent efforts—[Wilfred] Laurier in 1911, and
Mackenzie King was offered it by Roosevelt, 1945. But I think he looked in his
crystal ball and said, “No, it’s too big a leap, politically.” And it took Brian
Mulroney to do this, about another forty years later.
So, the trade-off for us has always been, be a reliable ally. In return, we get
access to the U.S. market. And what the U.S. is going to push us on now—and this
will hold true for Biden just as it did for Trump—will be to do more up in the
North, where they are concerned [with] what’s going on and, in particular, the
North Warning System and modernization of NORAD. That’s going to be
expensive, but it will allow us to reach a larger goal, and that’s the NATO target
of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense—something we did just as a matter of
course for many, many, many years. But, in the dividends of the Cold War, we
dropped down to a little less than 1 percent, and today we’re about 1.1 percent.
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ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: So, following up on that then, and on what you
said, I think a lot of people who look at the United States today from the outside—
as Canadians often do, and people around the world still do—there’s a sense that
America is a nation beset, preoccupied with its own problems. And that is maybe
nowhere better exhibited than in the snowstorm last month in Texas where, you
know, conditions were evident in the media that made the United States look like,
you know, a developing country. In the midst of all this, what’s the big idea? What
is it that, you know, the United States can champion, and that we can join with
them in championing?
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, the big idea to me is kind of a restoration of
democracy. And I think Biden implicitly gets this, and I think Trudeau. And I do
think this is something that goes across the political spectrum, because I do think
the big challenge today is between open systems and closed systems. So, when
Biden talks about a “league of democracies,” somehow democracy has to get its
mojo back, because I think democracy is also the best way to provide for a sharing
of the wealth. I think we also got away from that in the last twenty years with the,
sort of, embrace of freer trade and the triumph of the market and things. But it’s
not what democracy—you go back to the Greeks—was sort of built upon. And so,
I think that—you know, I talked about Lincoln—I do think that’s something that
we have to get back to in democracies.
And I do think that Biden is absolutely right when he says the best antidote to
populism—which is really the road to authoritarianism—is a reform and
revitalization of democratic institutions, and a more equitable sharing of the
wealth. It’s not socialism, but it is what we enjoyed during what many people saw
as that golden period of American and Western history, from really the Second
World War to really about the late seventies, when the oil shocks began to change
things. And it was things like the GI Bill [Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of
1944]. Citizens were much more engaged, our voting was much higher, and people
felt that the government was there to defend them. I remember, Ronald Reagan
says, “government is the problem.” Bill Clinton says smaller government. But, I
think we’ve learned in the last few years, particularly around COVID, that
government’s essential.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Yeah. Yeah, certainly. And, you know, much
has been made of the difference between the Trump and Biden administrations’
approaches, and their efforts to curtail the coronavirus pandemic. How much of
the change in administration has affected the approach to combating the
coronavirus pandemic here in Canada? Do you think that we are going to benefit
in any way from what the Biden administration has done? Or do you think they’ll
continue to be preoccupied with combating the pandemic domestically?
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, I think Biden, politically, first has to get the
COVID under control. This is the test for him. Remember, he’s facing an election
in two years. As I pointed out earlier, the margins in the House and the Senate—
the Senate is 50-50, in the House the Democrats lost seats in the last election. To
succeed, he has to win and hold the Senate and the House in the next election. And
he will be judged by the voters on how he deals, first, with the COVID crisis and,
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of course, inextricably linked to that is where are we in terms of the economy?
And the economy means a restoration of jobs.
From a Canadian perspective, we’ve got to hope and pray that he succeeds,
because our own economy is—again, I tried to point out—so linked to that of the
United States. American recovery means Canadian recovery. If Americans aren’t
buying, then we’re not selling. And then, despite our best efforts to diversify—
which is something I strongly believe in—but still, the easiest market for . . . this
government’s putting, I think rightly, emphasis on those small, medium-sized
enterprises, women, Indigenous groups, others to get involved. The easiest
market—we’ve done polling on this—tells us for them to get involved, to access
is still the United States.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Yeah, and I mean, just as sort of, you know, a
box score, what would you give Biden in his first, well, we’re coming up on two
months in office.
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, I look at the opinion polls and he’s enjoying
favorability over 50 percent. You know, I look at RealClearPolitics every day to
just, sort of, see where things are at. And he is where he wants to be, but now he
has to deliver on this—what I would call getting it done. He’s got the same
problem that we have in Canada-U.S. relations, he has to get it done.
The rhetoric is there, although he’s not Olympian like Obama. But he is a
gifted legislator. When I met him, he was chair of the Senate [Committee on
Foreign Relations], and when I met him, could this be 2004, well he’d been elected
in 1973 as a senator. So, he’s very experienced. He is very much a creature of the
U.S. Senate, where he served for thirty plus years, before serving as vice president
for eight years.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Yeah. So, an old hand and a good hand . . .
MR. ROBERTSON: Old hand, and also a people person. You know, I worked
Capitol Hill, and I used to say there were two types of politicians: there’s the
talkers and then there’s the listeners, and the talkers outnumber the listeners about
nine to one. Biden’s a talker. When I first met him, I mentioned that my
grandmother was born in Scranton. Well, he just took right off then, “Oh, where,
what was she doing?” This and that. When I saw him thereafter—and I didn’t see
him very often because he’s a busy guy—but I would, these were often informal
things, because I would go up and just try and see people because it was very tough
to get access. He was always engaged and engaging. He likes people. You see this.
This comes through, and I think that’s important.
Barack Obama, by comparison, was a listener. I knew where the senator
smoked—he was quite famous already, by then he’d given his great speech—and
I would go up to him, I’d make my pitch, he’d listen, nod, and go away. The only
time I ever got him to talk was when I talked about an environmental issue and he
said, “Ah,” he, sort of, piped up and said, “I’d been a state senator in Illinois,” and
he’d put through legislation which prevented water from being pulled from the
Great Lakes down to California and he got talking. I could see in his eyes this guy
was green.
I always wished Stephen Harper read that dispatch back, because remember
we made a big deal of Keystone and it just didn’t work out for us. We made it the
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litmus test of the relationship, big mistake. Never make litmus tests with the
Americans because, first of all, they don’t think that much of us. But, if we go in
with a big demand that doesn’t, isn’t going to go anywhere, nothing happens. And
our relationship is so complex that we really have to be pushing on all fronts at all
times, and don’t make any one big project the end all be all. I would, you know,
with the exception of, say, the Canada-U.S. renegotiation of the trade agreement—
that involved everything. But still we were working on other fronts, including the
environment, including on defense, at the same time.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Do you think, later this year, we’re going to see
some domestic vaccine production in Canada? Do you think we’re going to get
American assistance with that? Do you think in the interim, the new administration
is in any position to facilitate the export of U.S.-made vaccines to Canada?
MR. ROBERTSON: I don’t think that’s . . . Well, to back up, yes, I think
we’re going to see the restoration of domestic vaccine production in Canada. I
think they’re talking about doing it just outside of Montreal where we used to, you
know, we tried to make pharmaceuticals, but the natural market forces meant that
it just didn’t work, and stuff pulled away.
And we made a mistake, as other countries did as well. I think we’ve learned
through the pandemic that resiliency, particularly when it comes to health, is
really, really important and when it comes down to pandemics and things, borders
will close, so you have to have domestic capacity. This is going to be as important
as maintaining a military. And so, I think we do that for our own purposes.
Will the U.S. be helpful? Well, we may get some U.S. investment. One thing
we do really well in Canada is we do clinical trials. They often use Canada as a
kind of test bed for new drugs because we’re a good demographic portrait of the
United States, with a couple of exceptions—they’ve got more Latinos, we have
more Asians—but you can do a portrait. And because of our big university
hospitals, and I think our national health system does help things, Americans do
clinical trials up here. So, I think that you can make a business case as to why you
might want to do this. The relationship between our [Public Health Agency of
Canada] in Winnipeg and the Atlanta CDC [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention], there’s a lot of things that that we have in common. And I do think
that there’s going to be much more emphasis now on health as a consequence of
COVID in all governments. And yes, that will involve, probably, more
collaboration.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: So, one of the questions that has been
forwarded to me from a member of the audience is the shifting, or the potential for
a shifting political landscape here in Canada. We’ve seen concerns raised over the
WE Charity scandal, and the prorogation of Parliament last September. And
they’ve led to whispers of a potential federal election following—possibly, later
this year. Barring any sort of access to a crystal ball that you might have, how do
you think a change in leadership in Canada is going to impact Canada-U.S.
relations and efforts to work with the Biden administration?
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, my presumption would be, if there’s a change in
leadership, it’s probably going to be a conservative leader. And my observation
would be that the last great battle on how we approached the U.S. was the election
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of 1988, on free trade. And, of course, it was ironic, because the Liberals had been
the free trade party until 1984—or almost ‘88, because even then I think [John]
Turner, himself, was somewhat conflicted—whereas the Tories had been,
traditionally, the anti-free trade party. But we fought that election.
It’s worth reminding ourselves that, while Mulroney won the election, it’s
because of the vagaries of our system. And we sometimes criticize the American
system, but he won with 40 percent. I’m glad he did, I was working on the free
trade negotiations. But he only carried Alberta and Québec, but had enough of a
majority in Parliament that he was able to get the Free Trade Agreement through.
And, despite all the critics concerned that we were going to lose our sovereignty,
in fact we didn’t, we became much richer as a consequence. And that allowed us
to invest in the programs that I think make us Canadian—things like Medicare,
and education, and the rest.
But what it did, when [Jean] Chrétien came to power in 1993—and this was
really important—he set aside, as did Bill Clinton, the criticism of freer trade. And
with the sleight of hand of a couple of environmental and labor accords—
important in their own right, but not nearly as important as they would later
become—basically bought into free trade.
But in terms of the relationship, overall relationship, my observation would
be that the Conservatives are just as inclined to get along. They recognize, as Brian
Mulroney did, that the most important relationship any prime minister has is with
the president of the United States. And so, an Erin O’Toole would be, as would
Andrew Scheer, as would any other putative . . . as would Peter MacKay, any other
Conservative leader, I think would do the same.
Not so sure about the NDP [New Democratic Party], but I also think the
discipline of power, if they ever achieve power, would exert itself to change things.
I certainly saw this with provincial premiers. And you see this with Mr. [John]
Horgan, I saw it certainly with Gary Doer, NDP premier from Manitoba, Darrell
Dexter, the only NDP premier in Nova Scotia. They all recognized that their
economies depended on their access to the United States. That’s the great
attitudinal shift I’ve seen since 1988. Whereas in 1988, eight of the premiers
opposed freer trade. Today, you wouldn’t get a premier across Canada—socialist,
separatist, Liberal, or Conservative or NDP—who wouldn’t favor closer relations,
especially economic relations, with the United States, because they recognize
that’s what generates revenue for their economies.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: So, I’ve had a further question from our
audience as to what it is that Canada should be looking at in terms of its foreign
policy beyond the United States, and how we might work both to advance our own
interests but also to dovetail with the agenda of the Biden administration. What
maybe are, sort of, three areas that Canada should be looking at and working
towards in terms of its broader foreign policy that might assist and, at the same
time, promote our own interests?
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, Chi it comes down, to me, to basically just one.
And that’s what your institute’s all about, and that’s rules-based order. Whether
we’re dealing [on] a bilateral basis with the United States or multilateral, that’s
how Canada swings its weight internationally. And I think Canadians, because we
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are people of the world, our identity is, in part, how we’re seen abroad. So, I think
the efforts that this government is making—as would a Conservative government
and, I think, an NDP would do the same thing—in terms of bolstering the
multilateral system.
Multilateralism, which is really a new concept—really, post-war. Prior to that
it was concerts of power and spheres of influence. And in that world, which
endured for centuries, it’s big versus small. And we’re middle power, but we get
lumped into the small and, as Thucydides put it, The History of the Peloponnesian
War, when it’s big versus small, small get dictated to.
What we’ve created, in kind of rules-based order—which is the greatest act of
generosity and the American idea of Franklin Roosevelt and then subsequent
American presidents all the way from Truman to Obama, not Trump, but Biden
shares this—is create this multilateral system with rules-based order. That’s how
we advance our interests. It doesn’t matter what we’re talking about, whether
we’re talking about climate—which is critically important today—or the
economy. It’s doing it in a rules-based system that we invest in, is vital.
But, one thing I think we learned over the last four years, despite our best
efforts—remember the Germans and the French created an alliance of
multilateralism, but it wasn’t enough to sustain the system, and the system is still
on its back foot. It does need to be rebuilt. And so, it’s still an open question, which
is why this idea of the democracies coming together, I do think, is really important.
And I think anything we can do to contribute to that—as we’re doing incrementally
with the World Trade Organization through the Ottawa Group, as we’re doing in
the Lima Group to help Venezuela, as we’re going to probably be asked to do in
Central America to be helpful—that’s what we should be doing because, first of
all, it wins us influence in Washington. And, bluntly, in terms of Canadian place
in the world, if we have access in Washington, then the rest of the world— which
is always befuddled by what the Americans are doing, particularly in a Republican
administration—they turn to us and ask us to interpret for them.
You know, my friends in Trudeau’s office tell me in the first year in office, he
was reaching out—as he should, brand new leader. But, the day that Trump was
elected, the phone calls started coming the other way from London, and Paris, and
Berlin saying, “Explain to us what just happened.”
Which leads me to another point, and which is something your institution is
doing but we don’t do enough of in Canada. We’re the best placed country in the
world to understand the United States, and help interpret that. But we don’t put
nearly the weight, in that interpretive fashion, at our universities and research
centers, on understanding the United States, which is critically important,
particularly for fellow democracies.
And the Chinese are also fascinated by what’s going on in the United States.
Conversations I have with the Chinese ambassador are as much about what’s going
on in the United States as they are about what’s going on in Canada.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: So, just one further question that I’ve received
from our audience. I’m wondering if you could give both a recap of some of the
most pertinent, and yet overlooked, changes since Biden took office, and perhaps
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also provide a projection of how Canada’s relationship with the States will look
post-lockdown and, potentially, post-pandemic.
MR. ROBERTSON: Well, I think the most significant change with Biden is
what I would call—and it’s a phrase they use in Congress—return to regular order.
The system works on order. Again, the law institute understands this, the rulesbased system. And Biden is very much of that, and that is what he is restoring, and
I think successfully. It may not be as exciting as Trump, but gosh it certainly works
a lot better. So, that’s pertinent, and often overlooked.
Where we’ll be, well, we’ve got a Roadmap. And, again, full credit to Biden
who reached out because he wants to prove . . . And Canada is actually—this is
important—we’re the demonstration project for the rest of the alliance. He’s
sending off [Antony] Blinken, and I think a couple of other secretaries are heading
off to Tokyo, and probably Canberra this week. And he’s had conversations with
those in Berlin, and Paris, and London. But, I’m told they chose us as kind of the
closest, nearest ally—and probably the easiest one to come up with. Let’s show
the alliance that we truly mean business and that we are going to take them
seriously.
And the Roadmap was very much a Canadian creation. We came up with the
headings, but then the Biden folks shrewdly and smartly filled in the gaps. So, for
example, when you get to “Bolstering Security [and Defence/Defense]”—which
we included, the fact that probably got pulled out, two bits there—the reference to
the 2 percent commitment at the Wales Summit in 2014, to do more in defense
spending, the burden-sharing, which is something every American president
including Trump has made, is there. And that was inserted by the Americans, but
the rest of it was basically our, sort of, agenda. And smart work on our part.
And I do give the Trudeau government credit for getting the one big thing they
had to get right right, and that was the U.S. relationship. Trudeau, remember he
remade his cabinet, he dispatched [Stéphane] Dion off to Berlin and he brought in
Chrystia Freeland—who, of his cabinet ministers, proved as trade minister she
understood the relationship best. And Trudeau, despite the slapping around he got
from Trump, did his best effort to create a relationship with Trump. It had been a
bromance with Obama, but he did his best, and he’s now doing his best with Biden.
Took a risk early on by making the first call to congratulate him. Biden makes the
first call back, and now we’re enjoying the dividends.
But now we have to deliver. You know, getting it done is really important,
because we’ve got this Roadmap, it’s up to us to actually keep the Americans on
point because, as I pointed out, he’s got so many challenges. First, all the domestic
ones, and then the rest of the world. So, for us to succeed, it really is up to us. But,
we are blessed with a Roadmap, and a commitment by an administration that wants
it to succeed, because of its demonstration effect to the rest of the alliance.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Alright. Well, I wanted to take a moment to ask
if there are any further questions in the audience. We’ve had a few.
Alright. Well, I wanted to invite Victoria Ostrovsky to say a few concluding
words.
MS. VICTORIA OSTROVSKY: Hi. Good afternoon. Yes, I would like to
thank you, on behalf of the Canada-U.S. Law Institute and Western University, for
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taking the time to speak to us this afternoon about the relationship between the
Canadian and U.S. governments, and particularly the future of this relationship in
light of both the new Biden administration and COVID-19. So, thank you.
MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you.
ASSOC. PROF. CARMODY: Thank you, Victoria. I just wanted to thank
Colin on behalf of the institute for some very insightful comments today. And
normally, at this point you’d be receiving a few little presents from us. Those will
be following in the mail. But, in the meantime, we wanted to thank you and just to
let you know that we’ll continue to be watching your very insightful commentary
in the media. Whenever there’s a column by Colin Robertson, I’m sure to look it
up, as I’m sure many people are, both here and elsewhere, as we continue to watch
what’s going on in our great southern neighbor.
But, thank you again. And thank you to everybody, all of our attendees, and
have a great day. Thank you.
MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you.

